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RECENT BOOKS 
THE LEGACY OF HOLMES AND BRANDEIS. By Samuel ]. Kone/sky. New 
York: Macmillan. 1956. Pp. ix, 316. $6. 
"[H]e shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, shall appoint ... Judges of the supreme Court . ... " So prescribes 
the Constitution for the President. For few presidents with multiple op-
portunities-perhaps for only one-can there be strong support for a claim 
of a high average of excellence in the performance of this constitutional 
duty. In many more than a majority of instances, presidential appoint-
ments to the Supreme Court have brought distinction of place to men who 
did not match that distinction with distinction of performance in the subtle 
and difficult responsibilities of their office. This, of course, judges presi-
dential performances after the event, but from many appointees it seems 
clear that a dispassionate and qualified observer would not at the time have 
expected exceptional performance. Perhaps the chorus of politely re-
strained approval which usually greets those appointments not evoking 
active opposition manifests, at least among the informed, more of hope 
than of expectation. 
Justice Frankfurter has recently had occasion to tell us,1 in specific 
terms, what an appropriate appointee to the Court need not be or have-
and in more general terms what he should. In the course of doing so, he 
found that a consensus of informed judgment would establish a roster of 
distinction which would number sixteen, or possibly nineteen, men from 
among the seventy-five who have been members of the Court, omitting 
consideration of fifteen (now sixteen) contemporary and relatively recent 
members. It is possible to question both the size and the composition of 
this roster, but it seems fairly clear that membership has not been awarded 
with reluctant hand or niggardly spirit. More lively debate, or more posi-
tive opinion, might be anticipated were we to attempt to decide whether 
the ratio of distinction would be maintained, or even increased, had the 
discreet omission been omitted. 
Even on a roster of judicial distinction much diminished by more 
stringent standards of admission, most lawyers, and certainly most students 
of the law, would expect to find the names of Justices Holmes and Brandeis. 
Each brought to the Supreme Court high professional competence, earlier 
manifested in rather divergent fashions. Each was the possessor of a keen 
and wide-ranging intelligence-ranging, as it happened, in different di-
rections. Each performed his judicial task in characteristic manner by the 
full utilization of these attributes. But each had as well the ability, neces-
1 Frankfurter, "The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices," 105 UNIV. PA. L. REY. 
781 (1957). 
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sary to some extent for any judge deemed distinguished on a nation-shap-
ing court, to view with critical detachment against a horizon enlarged in 
time and space, not only the cases before him but also the institution of 
V:h~c:h 1,ie was a part, its and his function and performance, and the nation 
which it shares in shaping-perhaps to constrict, perhaps to develop. In 
short, each was able to an uncommon degree "to see things as they are," 
if we may borrow Arnold's compressed phrase, an ability the very desire 
for which, as Arnold remarked, "implies a balance and regulation of mind 
which is not often attained· without fruitful effort." 
· Finding sharp and continued disagreements among later Justices who 
were thought to share in what had become known as the Holmes-Brandeis 
tradition, Mr. Konefsky has set himself the task of looking into that tradi-
tion, if such there was, of examining and appraising separately the atti-
tudes and judicial performances of the two Justices who so often, in their 
sixteen years together on the Supreme Court, agreed with each other in 
disagreeing with all or most of their brethren. The result of Mr. Konefsky's 
investigation is to establish, certainly to his own satisfaction, that the title 
deeds of the two Justices' claims to distinction are by no means uniform in 
their merit, and that the so-called tradition which had been thought an 
alloy made more enduring by the blending of complementing elements was 
in fact an unstable mixture of disparate materials. The varying appraisals 
of these components are indicated by two sentences from the closing 
pages (p. 306) of the study. Of Brandeis: "The fusion of richly informed 
judgment and high social purpose is his legacy to the judicial process." Of 
Holmes: "Awareness of human fallibility is no justification, however, for 
moral indifference on the part of those holding high public office." 
Mr. Konefsky's pained estimate of Justice Holmes' shortcomings is not 
based upon those bravura passages-perhaps bravado, perhaps seriously in-
~ended, perhaps partly both-from Holmes' speeches which have evoked 
other hostile comment in recent years. Rather, his method is to sample 
what are deemed relevant actions and attitudes of both Holmes and 
Brandeis before their advent upon the Supreme Court, and thereafter to 
consider several limited, though still important, areas of their judicial ac-
tivities while on the Court. The scope of the areas considered is adequately 
indicated by the ultimate conclusions that while Bi:andeis was a man of 
economics and one who cared deeply about the results of social arrange-
ments, Holmes' economics was outdated or obsolete, and he lacked human-
itarian passion; while Holmes had some part in developing constitutional 
protection for speech, nevertheless Brandeis "took the theory much more 
seriously than did Holmes." (p.' 202) All this and more demonstrates, if 
demonstration were needed, that Holmes was not a Liberal, as Mr. Konefsky 
uses that word. It appears to follow therefore-no doubt is suggested about 
the inevitability of the conclusion-that he could not be a judge of the first 
rank, perhaps not even a worthy one. In fact, it seems to be clearly sug-
gested: tliough not quite explicitly stated, that the great reputation as a 
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Supreme Court Justice with which Justice· Holmes ·retired, was derivative 
and synthetic. This is indicated by the fact that when the Justice reached 
seventy-five, after almost fourteen years on the Court, and just before the 
appointment of Brandeis, several law reviews dedicated issues or otherwise 
paid tribute to him. It is the content of these tributes which Mr. Konefsky 
finds revealing. In the Harvard Law Review,2 for example, the tributes 
touch on Holmes the historian, Holmes the common law lawyer·and judge, 
Holmes the philosopher, but only one deals specifically with his work on the 
Supreme Court.3 On the other hand, when Holmes retired sixteen years 
later, he was thought of principally as a Supreme Court Justice, and -Sir 
Frederick Pollock had to appeal to his countrymen not to forget his service 
to the common law. If Mr. Konefsky does not quite conclude, he is clearly 
not unwilling to have his readers believe, that Holmes owed to the presence 
of Brandeis his latter-day development as a public law judge, such as Mr. 
Konefsky concedes it may have been. 
That Brandeis contributed to the development of Holmes, as Holmes 
did to Brandeis, and as others of their associates inevitably did to both,. it 
would be foolish to question. But to find denigrating significance in the 
attempt of a law review editor to achieve comprehensive coverage, par-
ticularly at a time when public law occupied much less a focal position iµ 
the law reviews generally than it does today, appears to indicate a mind 
eager to reach its conclusion. It may be enlightening to note than• when 
the Harvard Law Review came to pay tribute to Justice Holmes on his 
ninetieth birthday in 1931,4 the composition of its dedicatory issue is npt 
radically different from that of 1916. To find significant difference_ in the 
tributes paid to Holmes in 1916 and in the 1930's, if it existed, may be a 
more accurate indicator of the change in public or professional interest 
and appreciation than it is a measure of the development of the judge. 
Aside from the free speech cases, which began to come to the Court in 
significant number and context only later, it would be as safe a generaliza-
tion as any to say that the lines of Holmes' contributions to the develop-
ment of constitutional and other public law were clearly ascertai~able ·by 
1916. . . 
In his review and appraisal of the work of the Supreme Court and its 
members, Mr. Konefsky's writing has certain unfortunate characteristics. 
Spacious and question-begging adjectives are often substitutes f~r analysis, 
as are frequent quotations of the conclusions of other commentators, quo-
tations which range without apparent differentiation from the fatUOl,!S 
through the sentimental to the perceptive and acute. But what some might 
2 29 HARv. L. REv. 601 et seq. (1916). 
3 That one did not suggest a limited stature for Holmes as Justice of the Supreme 
Court. Frankfurter, "The Constitutional Opinions of Justice Holmes," 29 HARV. L. REv. 
683 (1916). 
~ 44 HARv. L. REv. 677 et seq. (1931). 
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think its principal weakness is that Mr. Konefsky's study is written in terms 
which suggest a serialized account of recurrent clashes between the Goods 
and the Bads. His conclusion, as indicated above, is that while Justice 
Brandeis enjoyed a merited pre-eminence among the Goods, Justice Holmes 
fell in with that side quite fortuitously, and never earned the place which 
popular opinion mistakenly awarded him on its Team. In the course of 
reaching these conclusions, there are several curious anomalies. Holmes' 
dissent, which supported resale price maintenance, in the Dr. Miles Medi-
cal Company case is one of the items cited as "evidence that he was not 
only illiberal but a downright reactionary." (p. 59) It is not mentioned 
that Brandeis, the man of economics, the "social scientist with a conscience," 
was, before his appointment to the Court, warm in his support of resale 
price maintenance, spoke in favor of it before businessmen, and advocated 
before a congressional committee legislation which would have sanc-
tioned it. 
Perhaps as curious and as revealing a comment as any is made in Mr. 
Konefsky's appraisal of the Holmes dissent in Lochner, a comment which 
may speak for itself: "Strictly speaking, therefore, what separated Holmes 
from the majority in the Lochner case was a matter of degree, a difference 
of view as to whether the New York legislature was justified in curtailing 
freedom of action in the circumstances disclosed by the case. Moreover, 
since Holmes saw no need for research to establish the reasonableness of 
the New York law, his dissent may fairly be described as altogether lacking 
in constructive criticism. In a fundamental sense, it was no more than a 
moral preachment, an earnest plea for judicial self-restraint." (p. 42) 
Whatever Holmes' judicial limitations, and there were some which Mr. 
Konefsky does not mention, his approach to personification of Marshall's 
famous admonition that "we must never forget it is a constitution we are 
expounding" is .likely to place him for some time among the forefront of 
Justices of the American Supreme Court, despite Mr. Konefsky's doubting 
appraisal. 
To those who have a concept of the judicial function differing from 
that of Mr. Konefsky-and the group may include some lawyers-the more 
damaging portrait, if it were accepted as accurate, would be that of Justice 
Brandeis. Mr. Konefsky speaks of him-and in each case approval appears 
to be indicated-as the "crusader" (p. llO), the "social scientist with a con-
science" (p. 163), whose "sympathies ... were deeply engaged in many of 
the causes before him; no one can attribute to him such impartiality [ as 
Holmes'] or lack of concern over social policy and its consequences." 
(p. 140) "It was Brandeis whose opinions conveyed the definite impres-
sion that he personally attached the same 'importance' to the 'ends' as did 
the legislators who were seeking to implement them." (p. 162) "No won-
der so many of his opinions give the impression that he was less concerned 
with his role as a judge and far more with the cause of effective govern-
ment." (p. 156) "Indeed, a judge for whom the social consequences of 
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adjudication were as compelling as they were for Brandeis may be assumed 
not to have worried about logical consistency." (p. 265) All this is con• 
sistent with, and supports, the attributed conclusion "that the Justice 
employed his judicial opinions as a vehicle for broadcasting economic 
and social ideas which he wished to see advanced. . . . His main concern 
was with the strategy for effectuating his pet theories, a fact said to ex• 
plain why so many of his opinions are really ingenious briefs. The 'open• 
mindedness' of the man was in his 'manner' but did not disturb the 
'substance' of his beliefs." (p. 163) There are the somewhat equivocal 
qualifications that "The fact that Brandeis did not have a completely 
closed mind on economic matters is confirmed . . ." (p. 177), and that 
"any suggestion that Brandeis carried his personal predilections to un-
reasonable lengths would distort the essentially statesmanlike character 
of his economic philosophy, but especially his conception of the judicial 
function." (p. I 73) 
This may be the Brandeis which some, possibly even some judges, 
see today. If it were an accurate portrait there would be many who would 
believe that such a judge more than merited Pope's rebuke, "Most critics, 
fond of some subservient art, Still make the whole depend upon a part: 
They talk of principles, but notions prize, And all to one lov'd folly 
sacrifice." But to reduce Brandeis from humanist to humanitarian is 
"to sink from ethos to pathos," and recalls Babbitt's related remark that 
"How the humanitarian loses proportionateness is plain; it is by his 
readiness to sacrifice to sympathy the ninety per cent or so of the virtues 
that imply self-control." Fortunately, there is abundant evidence both 
in the United States Reports and from other trustworthy sources,5 of a 
different Brandeis-of a character both on and off the bench well endowed 
with restraint and proportionateness. Brandeis, as did Holmes, had 
"perception not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence." 
Neither would have been found among the claque for Dr. Cole:µso. 
Ernest J. Brown, 
Professor of Law, 
Harvard University 
5 Cf. Freund, "Mr. Justic~ Brandeis: A Centennial Memoir," 70 HARV. L. REV. 769 
(1957). 
